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1. Introduction
   Despite the numerous publications in press and scientific literature (see: 
Note 1-4, etc), the topic of organized crime remains quite latent. Organized 
crime constantly expand spheres of the influence. Crime organizations are 
interested in access to state structures, determining a rate of economy and 
policy. The criminal structures have much riches, capital, they save richest 
experience of work with business, economy, separate political parties. On 
the one hand the organized crime is the serious danger for society, on the 
other hand the stripping of a cloak of mystery and myths of mafia and orga-
nized crime is highly topical. This topic is particularly important for the 
Russia. 
   It is impossible to single out any one reason for the extremely serious 
and total crisis currently affecting Russian Society. Much of it stamps from 
historical roots: the lack of a democratic tradition; Russia's eastern, and 
therefore marginal, proximity to the west; the nature of Orthodox religious 
ethics as opposed to Protestant; the centuries long tradition of despotism 
etc. The immediate source of today's problems begin in October 1917 with 
the unique social experiment to forcibly establish a social utopia (the slo-
gan on the gate of the Solovki labour camp read "Happiness Everyone 
Through Violence"). 
   The attempt to build utopia was accompanied by an unprecedented
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process of negative selection which saw those, most proficient in their field 
begin repressed, exiled or destroyed whilst the grey, mediocre (often crimi-
nally minded) elements of society were championed. The repression of the 
people became nothing short of genocide. 
   This eventually pushed theSoviet State and society into an unavoid-
able catastrophe, the main symptoms of which are; the disintegration of 
production and the economy; the loss of trade skills; the de-
professionalisation a d de-qualification of the majority of the working popu-
lation; the lumpensation of the people; the lack of and non-development of
a middle class which might provide some kind of stable social base; crises 
in the health, education, transport and communication services and other 
service industries; anumber of inter-ethnic onflicts resulting in large num-
bers of deaths; a series of political crises; crises of spirituality and morality; 
the increase in various forms of deviant behaviour (crime, drug addiction, 
suicide etc.); and the growth of Mafia type organized crime. 
    Gorbachev's Perestroika was a necessary attempt o save the power 
structures by way of reform. A similar attempt was made by Khrushchev 
(the "Thaw"). However, every attempt ended with the actual or political 
death of its propagators and was followed by "Stagnation". With all due 
credit to Gorbachev, his reforms turned out to be the most radical although 
even these did not turn out to be fully satisfactory. All those symptoms of 
socio-economic atastrophe mentioned above, remained untreated. Power 
is continually returned to the ruling nomenclature; the corruption, usual to 
Russia, has taken on a monumental nature in all organs of power and estab-
lishments; the militarization of economics and politics continues; inter-eth-
nic conflicts have given rise to masses of deaths; nationalist, anti-Semitic 
and neofascist groups have formulated and meet with no resistance(5). The 
criminal war in Chechnya is terrifying evidence of the neototalitarianism. 
The ever growing economic polarisation of the population, visible in the 
stark contrast between the poverty stricken majority and the "New Rus-
sians", a criminalised nouveau rich minority, is a source of very real social 
conflict. 
   The country is permitting mass human rights abuses, particularly in 
army and penitentiary institutions where tyranny and torture dominate. 
Confirmation of this may be found in the international research material 
compiled by Amnesty International and native research(6). The economic 
reform under way in Russia, the transition from planned state-run economy 
to market is beyond doubt of progressive nature. Side by side with it, some
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"criminogenic" consequences are traceable. The redistribution of property 
is being carried into effect with not only legal, but also with illegal methods 
(bribery, murders, threats) resorted to. 
   A sharp stratification (economic and social) of the population into a 
pauperised majority and minority, that have grown rich. The differentiation 
between the incomes of the 10% least prosperous and the 10% most pros-
perous stood at 1:4.5 in 1991; 1:8 in 1992; 1:10 in 1993; 1:15 in 1994. 
Emergence of overt (explicit) unemployment and of partial (incomplete) 
employment. The official unemployment rate in Russia is by no means very 
high: 1992 - 4.7% of ablebodied population, 1993 - 5.5%, 1994 - 6.3%; 
1995 - 7.7%. With all that still fewer have the official status of an unem-
ployed, 0.5-0.7% receiving an unemployment allowance. 
   However, firstly the Soviet people are notaccustomed to unemploy-
ment. Secondly, a considerable part of able-bodied population are only par-
tially employed (incomplete working day, incomplete working week, com-
pulsory "leaves"). Thirdly, structural unemployment is growing. Fourthly, 
the economic setback, a low per capita income a majority of population, the 
tendency towards unemployment rate growth result in a relatively mass-
scale psychological fear of becoming jobless. 
   Technological backwardness andincompatibility of the native produc-
tion and services spheres, that have manifested themselves in the course of 
reforms. As a consequence of this - the inferiority complex of their staff, 
their disqualification, marginalization and lumpenalization. 
   The disintegration of the services sphere and of the social infrastruc-
ture that have entailed further difficulties for the population. Virtual neglect 
of children and teenagers, whose parents are busy with acquisition of sub-
sistence means, while out-of-school centres for children and teenagers are 
closed down because of the lack of state financing, with private ones charg-
ing exorbitant ariffs, which very few can afford. With all that the amount 
of "temptations" (fashionable youth clothes, audio - and video - appliances, 
sweetmeats) has grown sharply, thus provoking illegal means for acquiring 
them. The radical changes in the system of values and norms, a state of 
anomie (E. Durkheim). Numerous mistakes and abuses of the country's 
leadership (authorities) by carrying the economic reforms into effect are 
also accompanied by criminogenic processes: corruption, incompetence, 
"nomenclatural" privatisation (a privatisation in whose course federal and 
local functionaries - "nomenclature"  --primarily lay their hands on ex-state-
owned property), etc.
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          2. Nature and Extent of Organized Crime 
   A. General Problems 
Organized crime is the functioning of stable hierarchical associations, 
engaged in crime as in business and setting up a system of protection from 
a public control by means of corruption. Criminal associations are a kind of 
social organization of a "working (labour) collective body" type. The growth 
of crime organizational degree is a natural process, it is a manifestation of 
the social systems as well as their subsystems organization degree growth 
(economy, policy, etc). It is a world-wide process. The high degree of crimi-
nal associations adaptivity (strict selection of the staff, strict labour disci-
pline, high rate of profit-making, etc) ensures their great vital capacity. 
"Mafia is immortal". 
   The membersof the criminal gangs - professional criminals - are not 
heroes, but they are neither scums of the earth. These are the people en-
gaged in their own business. G.Becker, a Nobel Prise Winner in the field of 
economy speaks about it in the following way: "Criminal activity is just the 
same profession or trade as joining, engineering or teaching which people 
devote their time too". It is chosen when the profit (the revenues minus the 
production costs) exceeds that which legal occupations fetch(7). 
   Certainly, what they do is not in line with moral orjuridical laws of 
society. But their activity is also aimed at satisfying social needs. Are we 
always in a position to draw a distinction between the legal and criminal 
business abiding by the criteria of morality and legality? In Russia it is 
hardly possible. 
   I suppose, that the three models of organized crime acknowledged (hi-
erarchical, local, ethnic models; organized crime as a business enterprise) 
(4.p.78-87) complement each other, "business enterprise" being the content 
of the organized crime activities, whereas hierarchical, local and ethnic 
models manifest organizational forms of this activity. The world's litera-
ture is more and more often laying emphasis on organized crime as a kind 
(form) of a business enterprise (1- 4, etc). 
   The criminal organizations (syndicate) building up the system of orga-
nized crime (industry) are defined by the following indispensable traits: a 
stable assotiation of people, designed for long-term activity; criminal kind 
of the activity; deriving maximum profit as the key goal of the activity; 
complex hierarchic structure of the association (organization) with the func-
tions delimitated (leaders, groups of supply and security, experts, etc.); cor-
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rupting power bodies and law-enforcement ones as the main means of the 
criminal activity; aspiration for monopolization in a certain sphere of activ-
ity or on a certain territory. 
   Criminal organizations like other social ones strive to exert influence 
on the state power and to exercise control over it (lobbing, bringing, infil-
tration of their representative into power structures, etc). 
   The high efficiency of business enterprise of criminal organizations 
can be put down to it, that their "professional selection", their "personnel 
selection" are done better, their "labour discipline" is strict, youngest, brav-
est, most enterprising people with the greatest strength of character are in-
volved, with a "with pay for labour" offered (for instance, in the organized 
crime the remuneration is several times as high as in similar structures of 
the Russian police).
  B. The Organized Crime in Russia 
   The organized crime in Russia after 1917 existed primarily in form of 
gangsterism, and later on since 1930s a peculiar well-organized association 
of "thieves-in-low"(thief-in-low is a professional thief or swindler, who has 
chosen crime as a permanent way of earning his living, well-known in the 
criminal world and obeying the "thief's law" a special code of criminals  - 
and observing and protecting it (the "thief's law") in the sites of imprison-
ment); "tzechoviki" [groups within professions] in the 50's; the merging of 
"Tyenyeviki"[shady dealers] with state structures and the beginnings of 
institutionalised corruption in the 70's; and the forming of Mafia type crimi-
nal societies from the 70's to the 90's. 
   The contemporary criminalorganization (syndicate) building up the 
system of organized crime (industry, criminal enterprise). Contemporary 
organized crime is entrepreneurship in form (an economic enterprise, crimi-
nal syndicates, criminal industry). Three basic kinds of criminal organiza-
tions are singled out with respect o content: criminal (racket, narcobusiness, 
etc.), economic and political (terrorism, striving for seizing power). The 
term mafia is widely-spread, though is not strictly scientific. In a broad 
sense the word "mafia" serves as a synonym of criminal organization (asso-
ciation). In a narrower (more specific) sense mafia is treated as criminal 
organization, characterised by: a high degree of organization and hierarchy 
and restoring to force for attaining the goals. 
   Three levels of criminal organizations exit; firstly a criminal group, 
secondly a criminal organization or association, thirdly a criminal society
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or community. For instance, there are in St.Petersburg four criminal com-
munities mafia type (so-called Tambov's, Azerbaijan's, Chechen's, Kazan's) 
some dozens criminal associations (for example, Komarov's) and the hun-
dreds groups. The Centre of Deviantology of St.Petersburg Branch of the 
Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Head of the 
Centre Prof. Dr. Y.Gilinskiy) take up a criminological study into black market 
economy and organized crime since 1993. The business sphere of 
St.Petersburg and other regions of Russia is divided between mafia groups. 
Excellently organized informational service nables them to track and moni-
tor all the commercial structures and the moment, when the new commer-
cial structure begins making profit and, consequently, arouses the interest 
of mafia. As the businessmen - respondents asserted, "100% of commercial 
structures are embraced by racket... Racket penetrated all the enterprises 
except those of military - industrial complex and some foreign firms". 
   There exist two levels of racket: imposing tribute on small kiosksand 
on commercial organizations. In the latter case, exept outright, extortion of 
tribute ("black racket") one can face various indirect, disguised types: for 
"guarding"
, for "rendering services in the field of marketing", in compli-
ance with the contract for "joint work", for "services" (for example, recov-
ering debts), etc. The structures of mafia "taking care" of the commercial 
structures include their representatives in their administrative and manage-
rial bodies. One cannot object, as firstly, the criminals have power, and 
secondly, who else can force a debtor to pay, even with the decision of the 
arbitration court on hand? 
   Our interviewers describe the contemporary situation: "One cannot do 
without illegal dealing": "legal and illegal methods are interlocked"; etc. 
Heads of the police special units side with them: "The medium of the busi-
nessmen is extremely criminalized... One has to bribe for everything... The 
debts have to be recovered by resorting to force... One cannot deal with 
taxation inspection without a bribe is a inevitability in the sphere of busi-
ness... The tax inspection is highly corrupted... Mafiosi can be not infre-
quently found among members of the broads of banks"; etc. Going by our 
interviewers tories, one is in position to single out the typical situations, 
when businessmen are forced to commit crimes. 
   Firstly, one has to bribe in the following situations: when registering 
enterprises, when taking lease of premises from state bodies, when acquir-
ing licences for its utilisation with state bodies, for obtaining a low rate 
bank credit, when reporting to the tax inspection, for customs formalities,
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etc. Secondly, one has to cancel revenues, for with the current axation rate, 
amounting to 80-85%, one cannot survive in the competition with other 
firms honestly revealing all the revenues. Thirdly, most of non-state-owned 
enterprises in the contemporary conditions find themselves "under the pro-
tection" of gangsters (mafia): they are "guarded" by some gang against oth-
ers and have to pay "tribute" for that and render services (obligatory). In 
particular, mafia include their "representatives" into councils of directors, 
boards of enterprises, organizations and banks. Thus legal and criminal 
business merge. Fourthly, the rigid normative regulations of some kinds of 
economic activity and the absence of such regulation on other fields of busi-
nessmen to ignore the law in some cases and make their own "laws" in 
others. Fifthly, the synthesis of legal and illegal elements in the country's 
economy engenders uch monsters as faked goods, services, forged securi-
ties. 
    The main fields of activity of St.Petersburg and Russia criminal orga-
nizations are follow: bank machinations (shady transaction) with Faced-up 
letters of advice; fictitious transactions with real estate;  hi  jacking and re-
selling of cars; illegal export of nonferrous metals; black market transac-
tions with the "humanitarian aid"(braiding city functionaries for a whole-
sale purchase); production and traffic of faced-up hard drinks; arms sale; 
counterfeiting money. A control over gambling, agencies for supplying 
sexual services, narcobusiness are taking shape. In 1995-1996 years the 
Centre of Deviantology spends a numbers of interview to the representa-
tives of the criminal world (Y. Kostjukovski). In a course of interviews the 
tendency to increase of professional skills of criminals has come to light. 
    Hi-tech crimes are connected to computer engineering, bank frauds, 
but new technologies connected to such prosaic areas as falsification of 
spirits drinks, drugs manufacture, hi jacking of automobiles, development 
of the new weapon. From a certain share of reliance it is possible to tell, that 
all new development in the field of computer engineering pass first of all 
through criminal structure. All growing attention is given to attraction of 
the scientific staff (the chemists, programmers, economists, lawyers, etc), 
who today is engaged in criminal business. 
   Narco-business is one of themost latent, well organized forms of or-
ganized criminality in Russia. The polices do not manage to be opened the 
chiefs of Russian narcomafia. «The plunder» of police till now become ei-
ther drug consumers or ordinaries distributors (lowest part of narcomafia). 
Only to indirect attributes we can judge about activity of criminal organiza-
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tion in sphere of narco-business: catching by police or customs ervice large 
drug-sets, wide web of drug distributors the revealed ways of drug transit 
and drug-traffic through territory of Russia, etc. Struggle against narcomafia 
complicated by total corruption of law-enforcement and authority struc-
tures and political games of Russia with the countries exporters of drugs: 
Azerbaijan, Chechnia, states of Middle Asia. 
   Mafia displays a keen interest in privatisation. As our respondent puts 
it, "their goal is to take hold of real estate". They obtain information about 
forthcoming auctions, come to the auctions with their armed men and dis-
tribute who buys what property and at what price. The active rivals from 
legal business are requested to keep from the purchase to avoid trouble. 
More and more information is supplied about lobbying some representa-
tives of state bodies of power by mafia. Consequently we confront 
criminalization of business in combination with economization and 
politization of the crime. 
   At last there are some official data of organized crime in Russia: criminal 
organizations committed 23820 crimes in 1995; police bring criminal orga-
nizations to light 785, 1990; 952,1991; 4352, 1992; 5691,1993 (8, 9). But 
the organized crime is very latency.
3. Comparative Evaluation of Various Anti-Organized 
 Crime Measures Including Legislations 
 to Combat Organized crime
   The measures of struggle with organized crime varied simultaneously 
with change of the forms of organized crime in Russia. 1918-1921 years the 
struggle with ganging, gangsterism (steady criminal groups, making mur-
ders, robberies and other heavy crimes) came true by the revolutionary and 
military tribunals, and also bodies of VChK (the All-Russia Extreme Com-
mission), which was given the right of direct punishment (including execu-
tion). The non-court punishment was applied widely and severely. 
   In the Criminal Codes of Russian Federation 1922 (Art.76), 1926 
(Art.593), 1960 (Art.77) years ganging meaned organization of armed gangs 
for robberies of the enterprises, establishment, organizations, transport, citi-
zens, and also for participation in gangs and robberies managed by them. In 
the criminal legislation the most severe measures of punishment for ganging 
(gangsterism) were provided: in the Criminal Code 1922 (Art.76) - execu-
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tion with confiscation of property, at presence softening circumstances  - 
deprivation of freedom for the term of not less three years with strict isola-
tion and confiscation of property; Art.593 Criminal Codes 1926 - depriva-
tion of freedom for the term of not less three years with confiscation of 
property and strengthening of punishment at hard circumstances down to 
execution with confiscation of property; Art.77 Criminal Codes 1960 - dep-
rivation of freedom from three till fifteen years of deprivation of freedom or 
death execution with confiscation of property. 
   In all criminal codes the increased punishment for crimes of which 
was provided were accomplished by group. However the real organized 
criminality frequently on the character, forms of organization and kinds of 
crime activity did not fall under formal legal concepts ("gang" or "group"). 
And judicial punishment and non-court reprisal pursued first of all political 
ends of the soviet totalitarianism state. On the other hand, from the moment 
of proclamation USSR by the country "winning socialism" has stopped prac-
tice of application Art.77 Criminal Codes ("there is no ganging in socialis-
tic state."). 
   The struggle with "thieves in law "was also conducted in basic of non-
law ways. During the Second World war many "thieves in law "partici-
pated under threat of execution or from patriotic reasons in war with fascist 
Germany. Being demobilized majority from them early or lately again got 
in penitentiary. But as the persons having "cooperation to authority" they 
have appeared "traitors" of theif's tradition, of the theif's law, so-called 
"bitch" (the word is used as the oath, insult) and did not admit new young 
"by thieves the law". The penitentiary administration has used it and has 
provoked "bitch's war " in all camps of archipelago GULAG. In bloody 
war was lost of very much old and new thiefes. On some time their number 
was sharply reduced. But, certainly, it could not "to liquidate" organized 
crime. 
   In 60's, 70's were generated steady crime clans on the basis of asso-
ciation of "thiefes" (professional criminality), "tzechoviki's", "tyenyeviki's" 
(white collar crime) and corruption of the government, officers, police in-
cluding the highest lead of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakh, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Moscow etc, the highest leads of Ministry 
of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union. 
   The attempt of struggle with the new forms of organized crime was 
undertaken i years of government by the country Y. Andropov (1983-1984) 
and proceeded at M. Gorbachev. To police, prosecutor's office, courts it
460  lE{~  31 6 3 t,
was authorized (!) to investigate and to consider criminal cases against some 
highest officers, oilier were dismissed, some of them have finished life by 
suicide (for example, former Minister of Internal Affairs USSR the general 
N. Schelokov). Radical political, economic, social reforms, which begin-
nings M. Gorbachev (so-called "perestroika") have removed on the second 
plan struggle with organized crime. However organized crime in these years 
could be put forward on the first plan. 
   From the end 80's, beginning of 90's the Russian society has become 
all better to realize economic, social, political danger of organized crime. 
However the real struggle from it has appeared very complexity. 
   First, had time to be generated well organizedcriminal communities, 
ensuring the safety by corruption of power structures and law-enforcement 
bodies. Secondly, long time empty discussions on a theme "is there the 
organized crime in Russia? Thirdly, the legislative base, criminal law have 
appeared insufficient for successful counteraction to criminal organizations. 
The projects of the laws "On the Fighting Organized crime", "On the Fight-
ing Corruption" are not till now accepted by Russian parlament. And the 
Decree of the president of Russian Federation No.1226 of June 14, 1994 
"About urgent measures on protection of the population from ganging and 
other displays of organized crime" contradicts the Constitution RF, work-
ing criminal law (it is confirmed by the resolution State Dumal of Federal 
Assembly RF of June 22, 1994 "About protection of the constitutional rights 
and freedom of the citizens at realization of measures on struggle with crimi-
nality". State Duma is a name of the Parliament of the Russian Federation.). 
   The new Criminal Code, which is accepted by Parliament and is signed 
by the president, comes into effect on January I, 1997. In the Code many 
novels should ensure a legislative basis of struggle with organized crime 
(definition of concepts "organized group", "criminal community", Art.35; 
an establishment of the criminal liability for organization criminal of com-
munity, participation i  it, Art.210; criminalization of actions, made by crimi-
nal organizations - kidnapping of the person, washing of money and other; 
amplification of the criminal liability for a some crimes - murder, grievous 
bodily harm, rape, theft, swindle, robbery, extortion and other, which ac-
complished by organized group; etc). Which practice of application will be 
of the new Criminal Code will show future. Fourth, technical, financial and 
personnel equipment of special police unite (first of all Regional Board of 
Organized Crimes) is unsufficient. 
    Fifth, political games and the corruption prevent development of sci-
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 entific strategy and tactics of effective struggle with organized crime. 
    At last, main: difficultly to expect on real and successful counteraction 
 to organized crime in conditions of economic, financial, social, political 
crisis and instability at total corruption of power structures (federal and 
 regional), police and courts. 
        4. Proposed Measures Including NewLegislations to 
          Combat Organized Crime 
    International experience of struggle with organized crime (in Italy, US
A, Japan and in other countries) shows, that the repressive measures of 
police and criminal justice are not so  effective. lit concerns even to the well 
financed programs (for example, so-called "Pennsylvanian"in USA). Espe-
cially it is difficult to struggle with organized crime in modern Russia for 
the reasons, stated above. 
    I think, the economical, social, political measures are more important. 
For instance: Economical, social, political support and development of le-
gal business enterprise, of legal human activity. It is necessary to remem-
ber, that the person is in need of material, financial, technical and other 
means of satisfaction of the natural, social and spiritual requirements. If the 
person does not find legal means, he will resort to illegal, including crimi-
nal means. The higher is the degree of "responsive" societies (A . Etzioni), 
the more is probability legal and less probability of illegal behaviour of the 
people for satisfaction of the requirements. Unfortunately, degree 
`responsive"of the modern Russian society is very low. 
   The economic policy of the state should ensurelarge profit of legal 
business, in comparison with illegal; Decrease of unemployment. The un-
employed, especially young, are main social base of organized crime. The 
share non-working and non-pupil of the persons of able-bodied age has 
grown in total of criminals revealed in Russia from 11.8 % in 1987 up to 
45.2% in 1995(8; etc); Reduction of corruption through political methods. "Corruption is global phenomenon" (10.P.2). But it is particular evil of Rus-
sia. The total corruption is main obstacle to combat organized crime in Rus-
sia. 
   Moreover the juridical measures are necessary. For example: Com-
plete of legislation about "combat organized crime", Law "On the Fighting 
Organized Crime" (Law "On the Fighting Corruption", Law "On the Money 
Washing", etc); Activity of the special police unit with high professional 
staff, equipment, etc.; Information, operational international connection of
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police; etc. 
   Criminal Organizations are inevitable element of contemporary soci-
ety. Criminal organizations are well adapted to society. So, may we have to 
adapt ourselves to organized crime? 
                       5. Cnclusion
   The following traits of organized crime of Russia are typical: A wide 
extent to which contemporary it is spread (control over 40-60% of the 
country's enterprises and banks); A very high profit ("superprofit") derived 
from criminal activities; Organized crime performs functions of law-en-
forcement bodies: "arbitration", "enforcement of rulings (verdicts)", guard-
ing so called "krysha" (roof), etc.; Total corruptness of power, administra-
tive and law-enforcement bodies at all the levels; A wide social basis for 
organized crime, because, firstly, many idle hands are available among the 
youth, secondly, in contemporary Russia a legal business activity is impos-
sible due to total corruptness, highest taxes (up to 80-85%), criminal men-
tality, social anomy; A wide extent to which violent methods are spread; 
The organized crime politization, the policy's and economy's 
criminalization. 
   Russia is going farther and farther along the way of the state's and 
society's criminalization. The democracy and the economic reform are 
jeopardised. 
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